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ON YOUTH CRIME AND THE
JUVENILE COURTt
STEPHEN WI ZNER *
It's a very depressing, horrible place. It's completely not in the real
world. . . . [H]ow does this court think it's going to rehabilitate a
fifteen-year-old who's lived in an entirely different society? . . . The
Juvenile] Court was made for the little newsboy who broke some-
body's window with a stone. That's when the laws were made. Not
for the fifteen-year-old who's into drugs and killing.
—A juvenile court prosecutor'
Did we win or did we lose?
We won.
Yeah? What did we win?
—The author and his client2
I. INTRODUCTION
In a thoughtful and provocative essay, Abbe Smith has provided a
forceful defense of the juvenile court in response to critics who predict
or advocate its demise. She tells a poignant and compelling story of
urban youth deprived of their childhood and hope for the future by
poverty and racism, drugs and violence, decaying neighborhoods and
blighted housing, bad schools and destructive peer influences, paren-
tal neglect and abuse, and lack of opportunity.' But it is these very
youths who cause residents of urban areas to feel increasingly insecure
for their personal safety. Compassion for disadvantaged youth does not
eliminate our fear of them, and understanding of the apparent causes
of juvenile lawlessness does not substitute for effective law enforce-
ment, humane or otherwise.
The juvenile court is only a part of the system of law enforcement
for juvenile offenders. It is no secret that the majority of crimes,
t Copyright 1995, Stephen Wirier.
* William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
Quoted in PETER PRESCOTT, THE CHILD SAVERS 168 (1981).
2 Conversation between a child and the author after a successful defense to a charge of
burglary in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Discussed in Stephen Wizner, The. Child and the
State: Adversaries in the Juvenile Justice System, 4 CoLum. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 389, 398-99 (1972).
3 Abbe Smith, They Dream of Crowing Older: On Kids and Crime, ante.
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especially crimes against property, go unsolved. And this appears to be
true whether the perpetrators are adults or juveniles. Many juveniles
who commit crimes (like their adult counterparts) do not get caught.
This is one reason why neither the adult criminal justice system nor
the juvenile justice system has proven effective in controlling anti-social
behavior. It would seem to follow that changes in either system, whether
by giving the adult criminal courts jurisdiction over some (or all)
juveniles, or by retaining all juveniles in the juvenile court, will have
no overall effect on the crime problem (except for incapacitating for
longer or shorter periods the few offenders who happen to be caught,
prosecuted, convicted and sentenced).
The argument between those who would abolish the juvenile
court, and those, like Abbe Smith, who advocate that it be retained
and its jurisdiction over juvenile offenders expanded, is not really
about crime control. No serious student of juvenile—or even adult—
crime believes that tinkering with the jurisdiction and procedure of
the courts, or even its sentencing power, can significantly diminish the
incidence of criminal activity in society.
If the controversy over the juvenile court is not about crime
control, what is it about? It is about the juvenile court's capacity to
impose dispositions upon those juvenile offenders who are adjudicated
delinquent; dispositions that are seen by the public as appropriate
official responses to the offenses juveniles have committed.
The reason that many seek to remove older, serious, repeat juve-
nile offenders from the juvenile court is that the juvenile court is not
understood to be a criminal court for children and adolescents. Con-
sequently, the court is not given the authority to impose services and
rehabilitative confinement of sufficient intensity and duration to have
any hope of reforming these offenders or of providing adequate pro-
tection to the community.
What is the justification for maintaining a separate, more lenient
justice system for minors? As Geoffrey Hazard has cogently argued, the
juvenile court requires "a coherent theory of its own." 4 If, as Abbe
Smith contends, juvenile crime is a reflection of a "social problem"
rather than an "individual malady," then the "individualized treat-
ment" which has been the hallmark of the juvenile justice system may
no longer serve as its primary raison d'etre.
4 Geoffrey C. HaZaILL The Jurisprudence of Juvenile Deviance, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE
CHILD 3, 4 (Margaret K. Rosenheim ed., 1076).
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II. A TALE OF THREE OFFENDERS
This is a story about three offenders whom we shall refer to as
"Adult Offender," "Mentally HI Offender," and "Juvenile Offender."
Adult Offender is a normal adult male. Mentally Ill Offender is a man
with a psychotic illness who suffers from delusions and hallucinations.
Juvenile Offender is a fifteen-year-old boy.
This is also a story about "John Q. Public," a decent, law-abiding
citizen. Mr. Public is a good husband and father; he has a job; he pays
taxes; he gives to charity; he coaches little league; he volunteers at the
local soup kitchen; he votes. In short, he is a model citizen. One day
as John Q. Public is heading home after a hard day at the office he is
viciously assaulted by Offender, who steals his wallet and runs away,
leaving Public lying beaten, bleeding and unconscious on the sidewalk.
What we do to and for and about Offender, if and when he is
apprehended, depends in theory upon which Offender we are talking
about—Adult Offender, Mentally Ill Offender or Juvenile Offender.
But, in substantial respects, the actions we take, and our reasons for
taking them, are in fact the same, regardless of which Offender at-
tacked and robbed John Q. Public.
Suppose, for example, it was Mentally Ill Offender who attacked
John Q. Public. Suppose, further, that Offender believed, because of
his psychotic thought disorder, that Public intended to kill him, and
was planning to do it with powerful, lethal, radioactive money that he
had in his wallet. So, poor, demented Mentally Ill Offender did what
he thought was necessary and reasonable under the circumstances—he
took steps to defend himself. He struck out in what he delusionally
believed was selklefense, attacked Public, grabbed his wallet, and threw
it down the nearest sewer.
Upon apprehension by the police, Offender, who is babbling
incoherently, is taken to the nearest hospital emergency room, where
he is diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic and dangerous, and sent by
ambulance, in restraints, to a state mental hospital. In time, with
treatment and medication, Offender is determined to be competent
to stand trial. He is prosecuted and found not guilty by reason of
insanity, whereupon he is ordered confined in a maximum security
psychiatric hospital until such time as he is no longer mentally ill to
the extent that his release might constitute a danger to others.'
5 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368, 370 (1083).
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An alternative scenario for Mentally Ill Offender, especially where
his victim has not been hurt seriously and chooses not to press criminal
charges, is civil commitment. Instead of his standing trial in criminal
court, a petition could be filed in the appropriate civil court seeking
his involuntary commitment, and upon presentation of clear and con-
vincing evidence that Offender is mentally ill and dangerous to others
or to himself, or "gravely disabled," the court will order that he be
confined in a mental hospital. 6
Suppose instead that it was Adult Offender, the normal, sane
adult, who assaulted Mr. Public. He, too, would be apprehended by the
police, but he is taken to the nearest police precinct, given Miranda
warnings, interrogated, formally placed under arrest, taken to jail, and
either released on bail or held in jail until his trial. In time, he either
pleads guilty or stands trial, and (unless acquitted) is convicted, and,
because of the gravity of the offense and a prior criminal record, is
sentenced to a substantial period of incarceration in a state prison.
Now suppose that it was fifteen-year-old Juvenile Offender who
beat and robbed John Q. Public. What happens to him when he is
caught by the police? Is he treated like Adult Offender or like Mentally
Ill Offender? The answer is that the law views him as being a little like
each of them, even though Juvenile Offender is not like either of them.
On the one hand, Juvenile Offender is not an adult, and therefore is
not considered fully morally responsible for his anti-social actions. On
the other hand, the typical juvenile offender is not mentally ill, and
therefore cannot be relieved of responsibility for his actions for that
reason.
Because Juvenile Offender is neither an adult offender nor a
mentally ill offender, his case is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. Here is what will happen to him. When he is apprehended by
the police, he will be taken to the nearest police station and turned
over to a Youth Officer. The Youth Officer will call Offender's parent
and notify her or him that Offender is in custody. Offender will then
be taken to the Juvenile Detention Center where he will be held
pending a detention hearing. At the detention hearing a Juvenile
Court judge will decide whether to release Offender into the custody
of his parent, or order that he remain in detention to await an adjudi-
catory hearing.'
6 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
573 (1975).
7 Schall v. Martin, 467 U,S. 253, 277 (1984). For a convincing critique of the United Suites
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At the adjudicatory hearing Offender will either "admit" to some
or all of the charges, or stand trial. A prosecutor, typically referred to
by some euphemistic title such as "court advocate," will present evi-
dence, and if the judge (in almost all jurisdictions there is no jury)
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Offender did what he is alleged
to have done, he will adjudicate offender a "juvenile delinquent."
Once Juvenile Offender has been adjudicated a delinquent, the
judge will order that a dispositional study be conducted by a probation
officer. Pending a dispositional hearing, Offender will be returned to
detention (unless he has been released to the custody of a parent). At
the dispositional hearing, the judge may place Offender on probation,
but in view of the seriousness of the offense and Offender's prior
juvenile record, the judge will likely order Offender placed for a fixed
period in a state training school or some other residential facility for
juveniles.
And so, our three offenders, although viewed by the law, and by
us, as significantly different from one another, have ended up being
treated essentially the same. Each of them, because he has engaged in
anti-social behavior, has been apprehended, subjected to legal proceed-
ings, labelled ("criminal," "mentally ill," "delinquent"), and confined
in an institution where he is isolated from family, friends and the rest
of society.
The differences in how the law views our three offenders would
appear to have less to do with actual ends and means, than with how
the law characterizes those ends and means. Thus, the ends of all three
systems—criminal, mental health, and juvenile—include proscription
of deviant behavior, social protection through supervision and inca-
pacitation, and reform and rehabilitation of deviants. The means by
which these ends are sought to be achieved include identification and
apprehension of deviants, adjudication, and disposition (sentencing,
treatment or placement).
However, it is in our characterization of these ends and means
where significant differences appear. In the case of Adult Offender, we
speak of crime and punishment; of Mentally Ill Offender, illness and
treatment; and of Juvenile Offender, delinquency and individualized
disposition. Thus, we refer to the incarceration of Adult Offender as
"imprisonment"; of Mentally Ill Offender as "hospitalization"; and of
juvenile Offender as "placement."
Supreme Court's decision in &hall, see Jean Koh Peters, Schall v. Martin and the Transformation
of Judicial Precedent, 31 B.C. L. REV. 641 (1990).
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
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Our professed reasons for depriving each offender of his liberty
likewise purport to be significantly different. In the case of Adult
Offender it is to punish (and, one hopes, reform) a morally blamewor-
thy individual for transgressing established norms of social behavior.
Our purposes are retribution, incapacitation and rehabilitation of a
criminal offender, as well as deterrence of other potential criminal
offenders.
In theory, these are not the reasons why we impose treatment and
rehabilitative services on Mentally Ill Offender and Juvenile Offender.
The law views these two offenders either as not morally blameworthy
at all, as in the case of Mentally Ill Offender, or as significantly less
morally blameworthy than Adult Offender, as in the case of Juvenile
Offender. It is this absence of, or significantly diminished, moral blame-
worthiness that distinguishes Mentally Ill Offender and Juvenile Of-
fender from Adult Offender.
But even with respect to these two offenders there are important
differences. Mentally Ill Offender is seen as suffering from an illness
that requires medical treatment, including hospitalization, medication
and psychotherapy. His deviant behavior is understood to be a symp-
tom of his illness. A major purpose of his treatment is to cure or control
this symptom.
Juvenile Offender, in contrast, is not seen as suffering from an
illness, but rather is viewed as a dependent nonadult who requires and
is owed nurturance, discipline, education and love from caring adults
in order for him to mature into a responsible, law-abiding, independent
adult. His anti-social behavior is understood to be a reflection of his
youthful inability to control his aggressive and selfish impulses, to resist
temptation, or to defer personal gratification. The justification for
imposing services on him and depriving him of his liberty is to help
him learn to control his behavior for his own benefit, as well as to
provide protection from him for the community.
If the juvenile justice system is in fact not able to perform both of
these functions, or even one of them, without further criminalizing its
dispositions by incarcerating more youths for longer periods, then the
case for maintaining a separate, more lenient juvenile justice system is
considerably weakened. An argument that can support the continued
existence of the juvenile court as the primary mechanism for address-
ing youth crime must offer more than poignant stories or a social
critique. It must offer, in Geoffrey Hazard's words, "a coherent theory."9
9
 Hazard, supra note 4, at 4.
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III. OF PARENS PATRIAE AND THE POLICE POWER: A COURT IN
SEARCH OF A THEORY
There are two theoretical sources of the state's authority to restrict
deviant behavior, the police power and the doctrine of parens patriae.
In a democracy, the police power is a function of the social contract,
representing power ceded to the government by the people to restrict
the freedom of individuals for the protection of public welfare, order
and security. The adult criminal justice system is the primary example
of state action under the police power.
In contrast, the doctrine of parens patriae originated in the power
of the English sovereign, as exercised through the courts of chancery,
to protect his feudal land interests when property was subject to own-
ership by "enfants" and "ideots."'" The king would assume paternalistic
responsibility for children and the mentally infirm for their own pro-
tection and to preserve the property in which they had an interest."
Current examples of the state acting as parens patriae include civil
commitment of individuals with mental illness, appointment of conser-
vators or guardians for adults with mental retardation, removal of
parents and appointment of substitute guardians for children, and
protective proceedings on behalf of neglected and abused children.
Although repeatedly invoked as the legal rationale for a separate,
more lenient, criminal justice system for minors, the protective power
of the sovereign as parens patriae does not provide a sound historical
basis for the state's power to sanction and control criminal behavior
by children and adolescents. In English practice, minors who commit-
ted crimes were prosecuted, if at all, under the criminal laws. The
chancery courts invoked the equitable doctrine of parens patriae only
in resolving disputes over guardianship and property matters affecting
minors and the mentally infirm who were deemed incapable of caring
for themselves.' 2
The juvenile court's delinquency jurisdiction does not derive from
parens patriae, but rather from the police power, as expressed by the
criminal law and the Elizabethan Poor Laws (and their American
counterparts) relating to the control of paupers and their children.' 3
i° See Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Pairiae: From Chancery to the juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L.
REV. 205, 207, 208 (1971).
" See, e.g., id. at 208.
12 See id.
13 See NORVAL MORRIS & CORDON HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME
CONTROL 157 (1970); ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL !STORY 134-35 (1923);
Rendleman, supra note 10, at 222-23.
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The childsavers who invented the juvenile court believed that they were
creating a benevolent institution that would exercise the state's protec-
tive role as parens patriae." What they did not—perhaps, could not—
admit was the underlying authoritarian nature of the enterprise. As
one commentator has observed:
It is important . . . to recognize that when, in an authorita-
tive setting, we attempt to do something fora child "because
of what he is and needs," we are also doing something to him.
The semantics of "socialized justice" are a trap for the unwary.
Whatever one's motivations, however elevated one's objec-
tives, if the measures taken result in the compulsory loss of
the child's liberty, the involuntary separation of a child from
his family, or even the supervision of a child's activities by a
probation worker, the impact on the affected individuals is
essentially a punitive one. Good intentions and a flexible
vocabulary do not alter this reality. This is particularly so
when, as is often the case, the institution to which the child
is committed is, in fact, a peno-custodial establishment. We
shall escape much confusion here if we are willing to give
candid recognition to the fact that the business of the juvenile
court inevitably consists, to a considerable degree, in dispens-
ing punishment. 15
Why argue about the historical or theoretical basis for the juvenile
court's delinquency jurisdiction? Because much of the debate over the
performance of the juvenile court grows out of confusion and disagree-
ment about its purpose and function. If we can be clear about the legal
theory that drives juvenile court practice—that it is the police power
and not parens patriae—then we can be honest about the court's role
in protecting the community from youth crime and realistic about its
therapeutic goals. Although it would be wrong to deny that most
children—including those who commit crimes—are more immature,
irresponsible and dependent, and therefore less morally blameworthy,
than most adults, it is simply not true that we incarcerate a youth who
has robbed and beaten an elderly person for the same reason that we
place in protective custody a child who has been neglected or abused
by his parents.
14 See, e.g., THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT (Jane Addams ed., 1926); Julian W. Mack,
The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909).
15 FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18 (1964).
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IV. QUESTION: WHEN ARE CHILDREN NOT CHILDREN? ANSWER:
WHEN THEY COMMIT SERIOUS CRIMES
Almost from its inception the juvenile court has considered cer-
tain children who have committed very serious crimes to be ineligible
for the court's nonpunitive, treatment-oriented dispositions. Thus, in
1903, only four years after its founding, the Chicago juvenile court
transferred fourteen children to the adult criminal court.' 6 Eventually,
every state, the District of Columbia, and the federal government
enacted laws authorizing or requiring the prosecution of certain mi-
nors in adult criminal courts.' 7
The very existence of the juvenile court was challenged by the
eminent legal scholar John Wigmore, who denounced juvenile delin-
quency legislation under which, in his words, "murder, arson, burglary,
robbery, rape, and all the worst offenses are withdrawn from the
regular courts of criminal law for [the juvenile] section of the criminal
population."' In Wigmore's view, the reformers who invented the
juvenile court were "virtually on the way to abolish criminal law and
undermine social morality."'
Ambivalence regarding what to do about juveniles who commit
serious crimes, or are repeat offenders, has troubled the juvenile court
from the beginning. Juvenile delinquency legislation has attempted to
embrace two contradictory premises: (1) that the juvenile court is a
place for all children who commit crimes; and (2) that the juvenile
court is not a place for children who commit violent crimes, or are
repeat offenders. The first proposition represents the original intent
of the turn-of-the-century reformers—Jane Addams and her associ-
ates—to rescue the unfortunate children of the immigrant poor from
their wretched urban surroundings, as well as from the harshness and
legal rigidities of adult criminal courts. 2° However, as Anthony Platt has
argued, the childsavers held sentimental views about children who
committed crimes, and had naive expectations regarding the efficacy
16
 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFEND-
ERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH GRIME 55 11.51 (1978) (citing CooK COUNTY [ILLINOIS] CHARITY
SERVICE REPORT 253 (1920)).
17 YOUTI1 IN ADULT COURTS: BETWEEN TWO WORLDS 97-100, 143 (Donna M. Hamparian ed.,
1982). For a critical analysis of the transfer of children to adult courts, see Stephen Winner,
Discretionary Waiver of juvenile Court jurisdiction: An Invitation to Procedural Arbitrariness, 3 CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS 41 (1984).
18john H. Wigmore, juvenile Court v. Criminal Court, 21 ILL L. Rim 375, 375-76 (1926).
19 Id.
2.11 See ANTHONY M. PLATY, THE CHILD SAVERS 99-100 (1969); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BF.ST
LAID PLANS; AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 16-56 (1978).
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of nonpunitive, therapeutic approaches for dealing with juvenile of-
fenders. 2 ' The childsavers probably were not thinking about children
who committed violent crimes, and certainly not about those who did
so repeatedly. The second proposition, that the juvenile court was not
intended for such children, reflects the widely held belief that some
criminal offenses committed by juveniles are so serious that the maxi-
mum periods of institutionalization authorized by juvenile court legis-
lation are insufficient to protect the community, punish (and reform)
the offenders, and vindicate important moral values of the society.
The existing system attempts to implement both of these prem-
ises—that the juvenile court both is and is not the appropriate institu-
tion for dealing with juvenile offenders—by acting as though certain
children who commit crimes are ipso facto not children. Such children
are "waived" or transferred to the adult criminal court (or the adult
court exercises initial, concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction over them). 22
Maintaining juvenile court jurisdiction over those youths whose
offenses are not too serious, and who are deemed to be "amenable to
treatment" with the resources available to the juvenile court, while
creating a mechanism for expelling or excluding those juveniles for
whom the procedural and sentencing alternatives that exist in the
adult criminal court are thought to provide the acceptable level of
protection for the community, is, in the words of Justice Fortas, "an
invitation to procedural arbitrariness."25
 This is because we are not
capable of articulating or agreeing upon a precise definition of the
juvenile offender who should, in every case, be prosecuted in the adult
criminal court, a definition that would ensure that all juveniles who
should be in the adult court, and only those juveniles, are in fact sent
there. 24
But there is also an obvious theoretical problem in pretending, in
the name of community protection, that some children are adults. A
philosophical premise that provides the theoretical underpinning for
the juvenile court is that as a matter of equity and justice we ought not
treat juveniles who commit criminal offenses as if they were equally
responsible for their actions as adults who commit similar offenses.
The foundation of the juvenile justice system is that children and
adolescents who commit criminal offenses are less morally blamewor-
thy than adults who do so. A corollary of this premise is that juvenile
21 PLATT, supra note 20, at 67-74.
22 SMYOUTH IN ADULT COURTS: BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 17.
23 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
24 .SeeWizner, supra note 17, at 46.
September 1995]	 YOUTH GRIME
	 1035
offenders, even those who commit serious crimes, ought not to be
subject to the harsh realities of the adult criminal court, ought to be
protected from official contact with adult offenders, and ought to
receive services—including institutional confinement—separate from
adults.
Is it possible to retain our commitment to this ideal while also
providing more appropriate legal responses to serious juvenile crime?
To the extent that a judicial system plays any significant role in reduc-
ing crime or protecting the community from those who commit crimes,
the juvenile court could be empowered in appropriate cases, involving
older, serious, repeat offenders, to impose longer and more rigorous
terms of rehabilitative confinement than is now legally permissible.
Under such a system no juvenile would have to be transferred to an
adult criminal court.
The issue remains, however, to what degree we can enhance the
capacity of the juvenile court to impose more severe sanctions on
juveniles who commit crimes without heading down the road to aboli-
tion of the juvenile court as we have known—or imagined—it." It
should be possible within the juvenile court to provide reasonable
protection for the community from older, serious, repeat juvenile of-
fenders and still to retain dispositional alternatives that promise and
deliver individualized treatment and other nonpunitive habilitative
services. To accomplish this we will need to be clear about the law
enforcement role of the juvenile court and to keep our promise to
dedicate resources and provide services to disadvantaged and troubled
youth.
25 See Stephen winner & Mary F. Keller, The Penal Model offuventle Justice: Is Juvenile Court
Delinquency Jurisdiction Obsolete?, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1120, 1134-35 (1977).
